



Effective, Scalable Threat Detection & Response

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My Background

- Open source tool development (Volatility, Registry Decoder)
- Co-Author “The Art of Memory Forensics”
- Led numerous insider threat investigations
- Perform incident response on large networks targeted by sophisticated threat actors



Traditional Detection & Response is Dead

- Traditional investigations only required analysis of a small number of systems
- Anti-forensics tools and techniques were easy to identify and work around
- Data sources were constant and straightforward to analyze



Modern Detection and Response

- Modern IR involves tens, hundreds, or thousands of systems
 - Spread across networks and the world
 - Involving multiple platforms (Windows, Linux, Mac) and devices (laptops, desktops, servers, mobile, “smart” everything)
- Modern attacker toolsets are built with scale and anti-forensics capabilities as main features



Issues on the Endpoint – Anti-Forensics

- AV and security agents look for disk-based artifacts and activity
 - Skilled attackers operate only in memory
- Responders run “Live IR” toolkits to look for signs of evil
 - Modern malware specifically tampers with the APIs that “Live IR” toolkits depend on
 - Responders and threat hunting teams see only what the malware wants them to see



Issues on the Endpoint – Scale

- Attackers have many avenues to scale
 - PowerShell
 - Group policy
 - Remotely scheduled tasks
 - Automated build/update/configuration servers
 - SSH automation (Linux/Mac)

- Defenders are on their own



PowerShell Empire [1]

Origins

Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework. It premiered at BSidesLV in 2015.



Metasploit/Meterpreter [2]

Meterpreter is an advanced, dynamically extensible payload that uses *in-memory* DLL injection **stagers** and is extended over the network at runtime. It communicates over the stager socket and provides a comprehensive client-side Ruby API. It features command history, tab completion, channels, and more.



Issues on the Network

- Focused on detection of known malicious websites and domains
- Full network capture is generally not feasible or manageable on production networks
 - Too much data
 - After capture, still needs to be parsed and processed
 - Ubiquitous encryption



Detection and Response Questions

- Which users visited malicious-website[.]com in the last hour?
 - Day?
 - Week?
 - Month?
 - Year?

- Which users resolved bad-domain[.]org?

- Which users downloaded Flash-Exploit[.]swf?



More Questions

- Which internal systems did an infected system connect to?
- Which systems did Bob's compromised account access?
 - File shares? Internal web applications? Vendor portals?
- Malware[.]exe persists through a registry key, which other systems also have that key present?
- A keylogger records keystrokes to C:\operations.log and hides the file from the live system - can we still find it?



Effective Detection & Response Requirements

- Visibility
 - Ability to monitor actions across entire environment
- Historical data
 - Investigators can't incorporate what isn't there
- Acquisition & analysis processes that defeat anti-forensics



Endpoint Requirements – Event Logging

- Minimum:
 - Logins/logoffs
 - User account and groups creation/deletion/modification

- Desirable:
 - Process creation/termination
 - Use of sensitive privileges

- Must be centralized
 - Avoids anti-forensics clearing of logs
 - Allows for historical querying and hunting of suspicious activity



Endpoint Requirements – Memory Forensics [4]

- Direct examination of RAM, not output of live APIs
 - Not susceptible to traditional malware interference
 - MUCH more information available
- Scalability
 - No disk images
 - Can focus only on portions of memory with needed data structures
- Find system state anomalies, not malware-specific patterns
- Memory samples also contain relevant disk artifacts



Endpoint-Based Detection

- Automating event log analysis
 - Why did Bob in accounting log into the domain controller?
 - Why was a network admin logging into systems at midnight?
 - Why did Jane in HR suddenly have domain admin privileges?

- Gathering data artifacts through memory forensics
 - Map your existing “Live IR” artifacts in memory artifacts
 - Speed + avoid anti-forensics



Endpoint-Based Response

- Leveraging event logs
 - Review all logs around relevant timeframe
 - Which user accounts involved?
 - Which tools were run?
- Leveraging memory forensics
 - Find on-disk & memory-only malware
 - Find PowerShell and cmd.exe activity missed by agents and disk forensics
 - Find historical information no longer tracked by APIs



Scaling Endpoint-Based Response

- Focus the IR workflow to where we know the attackers were active
- While attackers were active:
 - Which systems were compromised accounts used on?
 - Do any systems have suspicious account creation?
- Use IOCs found through memory forensics to quickly sweep the network for other infected hosts



Threat Hunting on the Endpoint

- ▣ Review of event logs easily directs threat hunting
- ▣ Deep memory forensics of critical systems is a necessity to combat advanced threats
- ▣ Not convinced of the value of threat hunting?
 - Watch [3]



Network Detection and Response Requirements

- ▣ Passive DNS
 - Record all replies and requests sent through network
- ▣ HTTP request and responses
- ▣ Netflow
- ▣ Full PCAP is usually not feasible and/or desired



Network-Based Detection

- Leveraging Passive DNS
 - Resolution of newly registered domains
 - Resolution of domains from dynamic DNS providers

- Leveraging HTTP
 - Unusual user agents
 - Direct file downloads

- Leveraging Netflow
 - Why did Bob in accounting connect to a file server on the other side of the world?



Network-Based Response

- Bob's system was infected with malware from abc[.]xyz
- Which other systems resolved this domain?
- What are all the IP addresses that this domain ever resolved to?
 - Which other hosts contacted these IP addresses?
- Which internal and external resources did Bob's system contact after being infected?



Threat Hunting on the Network

- ▣ Reapply detection stage examples
- ▣ Perform deep review of historical data
- ▣ Leverage statistical analysis:
 - Of 5,000 employees, which domains were resolved by less than 1%?
 - Of 5,000 employees, why did only 1 talk to a particular IP address



Effective Detection & Response Requirements

- Visibility
 - We have full visibility of endpoints and the network
- Historical data
 - Event logs + capture of most relevant network data
- Acquisition & analysis processes that defeat anti-forensics
 - Accomplished through memory forensics and centralized logging



Scalable & Effective Results

- Ongoing threat detection that actually finds threats
- Once detected, highly focused incident response can begin
- Containment and remediation can focus on systems that were truly affected without missing attacker activity



Tools of the Trade

- Log aggregation / analysis - graylog
 - <https://www.graylog.org/>

- Memory forensics – Volatility
 - <https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility>

- Network capture – Bro or Suricata
 - <https://www.bro.org/> | | <https://suricata-ids.org/>

- The Almighty ELK Stack
 - <http://www.jeeatwork.com/?p=224>



Questions/Comments?

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