

A blurred document with the word 'monitor' highlighted in bold. Other visible text includes 'ORIGIN', 'warn', 'thing 2', 'duties 3', and 'pictures'.

Massively Scaled Security Solutions for Massively Scaled IT

Michael Smith, SecTor 2009

Who is Michael Smith?

- 8 years active duty army
- Graduate of Russian basic course, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA
- DotCom survivor
- Infantryman, deployed to Afghanistan (2004)
- CISSP #50247 (2003), ISSEP (2005)
- Former CISO, Unisys Federal Service Delivery Center
- Currently a Manager in a Big Four Firm

A large African elephant with prominent tusks is the central focus, standing in a lush savanna with tall grass and a hazy background. A large, light green thought bubble is positioned on the left side of the image, containing text. Three smaller green circles lead from the bubble towards the elephant's head.

\$75B IT Budget

**That's a lot of
green stuff!**

Caveat!

Elephants don't turn on a dime, neither does the US Federal Government!

Federal Information Security Management Act

Roles & Responsibilities

- Agency Head
- CIO
- Agency Security Officer

§3544(a)

Security Program

1. Periodic risk assessments
2. Policies and procedures
3. Security plans
4. Security awareness training
5. Periodic testing & evaluation
6. Remediation activities
7. Incident response capabilities
8. Continuity of operations

§3544(b)

Annual Security Review

- Determine sufficiency of security program
- Independent Evaluation (e.g., IG)
- Safeguard evaluation data

**§§ 3544(c),
3545 (e)**

Annual Reporting

- Reports from CIO & IG
- Report material weaknesses
- Provide performance plans

**§§ 3544(c),
3545 (e)**

The Standard Approach

- Break the elephant down into “bite-sized pieces”
- Group commonalities (common controls)
- Assess each piece—criticality, requirements, resulting risk
- Manage each piece individually
- Get better at securing each piece
- Caveat: each piece incurs overhead

Certification and Accreditation: IT Security in the SDLC



HSPD-12

- “Standard” Smartcard for federal employees
- Cards used for 2-factor authentication
- Set of standards for PKI, issuance, clearances, etc

Think "Reduced sign-on and dual-factor identification federated throughout 50+ enterprises"

Federal Desktop Core Configuration—FDCC

- Based on Air Force desktop configurations
- Attempts to be a Government-wide Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG)
- Needs automated evaluation tools
- Part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
- <http://fdcc.nist.gov/>

Security Control Automation Protocol—SCAP

- XML and protocols to exchange technical security information between products
- “Glue Code” between the following data sets:
 - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
 - Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)
 - Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)
 - Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
 - Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF)
 - Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL)
- More products certified weekly

Trusted Internet Connections—TIC

- Reduce Government Internet connections to 50
- Lowers the demand for skilled personnel
- Uses models from DoD and DHS
- Agencies share Internet connections
- In theory: simplifies protecting Internet connections Government-wide
- <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2008/m08-05.pdf>

EINSTEIN

- Run by DHS and US-CERT
- National-Level Security Incident and Event Monitoring System
- Provides alerting and Government-wide threat trends
- Offered as a service to other agencies


Standard Convergence

- One Government-wide standard for security management
- DCID 6/3 retired in favor of SP 800-37 and 800-53
- DoDI 8500.2 still in place but “bridged” to new convergent standards
- Transparent transition of people and process between civilian agencies, DoD components, and intelligence organizations

“Azimuth Check”

- Nobody knows where we’re going!
- Merging towards the center from regulation and technical solutions
- Enterprise gets the squeeze
- What about the pieces above the enterprise?
- We’re operating beyond the scope of traditional IT security doctrine, research, and products

My View of the World



- Each layer only knows the one above and below it
- Traditional IT security focuses on the Enterprise and Project layers

Existing Models of Management

*History Lesson Time: thought
you were just here to learn
about security?*














Observations and Truthinesses

- Control v/s audit burdens
- Skill of the constituency
- Need a security professional at each layer

Is it all just a matter of centralized v/s decentralized?

The Models Begat More Questions...



- At what layer do you address a specific problem?
- Can a specific solution “scale up” to the Federation/Community Layer?
- How do I get “clueful” people at each layer?
- How do I communicate between layers?

The Cybertastic Future: Management

- Use the Enterprise, Project, and Integration Layers
- Start in bite-sized pieces and consolidate wherever possible
- Need “clueful” people at all layers
- Organization at the Federation Layer for self-regulation—some people are already doing it

The Cybertastic Future: Process

- How do you keep from getting squeezed in the middle?
- If it's a pain for you, it probably is for others and can be scaled up
- How do we get information up to the higher layers so they can make a decision?

The Cybertastic Future: Vendors

- Support multiple 10-dot networks
- Products that tier between layers
- Federation and data import/export between products
- Compatibility with initiatives

Questions, Comments, or War Stories?

<http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/>

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